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There is broad agreement that fee-for-service reimbursement does too little to encourage the provision of efficient, high-value care. 
Consequently, Medicare and other payers are in-
creasingly moving toward alter-
native payment models (APMs), 
which disrupt the fee-for-service 
system by incorporating quality 
and cost targets into reimburse-
ment. Examples include account-
able care organizations (ACOs), 
which hold providers responsible 
for meeting annual cost and qual-
ity targets, and bundled payment 
programs, which hold them re-
sponsible for meeting cost and 
quality targets during 30-, 60-, or 
90-day care episodes.
In the best-case scenario, clini-
cians will respond to APMs’ in-
centives by improving care coor-
dination and integration, which 
may particularly benefit vulnera-
ble populations with higher-than-
average medical and social needs. 
On the other hand, there may be 
incentives for clinicians to avoid 
caring for these groups, who are 
at risk for high costs or poor out-
comes in part because of factors 
beyond clinicians’ control. Under-
standing APMs’ potential conse-
quences for vulnerable populations 
is critical if we wish to maxi-
mize benefits and reduce harms.
Vulnerable populations, such as 
people living in poverty and peo-
ple with disabilities, disproportion-
ately incur high health care costs 
and have poor health outcomes. 
Under fee-for-service reimburse-
ment, there has been little finan-
cial incentive to focus on attract-
ing or improving care for these 
groups, who often need low-mar-
gin services such as primary and 
behavioral health care. Under 
APMs, by contrast, the highest-
cost beneficiaries present the 
greatest opportunities for achiev-
ing savings, particularly in terms 
of modifiable costs such as emer-
gency department visits for poor-
ly controlled diabetes or hyper-
tension, or unmet mental health 
needs. Consequently, APMs may 
encourage clinicians to coordi-
nate care and pursue clinical inno-
vations such as behavioral health 
integration for these groups. Such 
innovation could improve care 
and reduce disparities affecting 
historically underserved groups.
Empirical data, however, have 
been mixed. For example, in the 
Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue 
Shield Alternative Quality Con-
tract, which replaced fee-for-ser-
vice reimbursement with global 
payments tied to quality measures, 
quality improved the most for en-
rollees in areas with lower socio-
economic status, and disparities 
between these populations and 
more aff luent ones narrowed.1 
Similarly, in the Physician Group 
Practice Demonstration, the pre-
cursor to the Medicare Shared Sav-
ings Program, people who were 
enrolled in both Medicare and 
Medicaid had the greatest reduc-
tions in costs and unplanned re-
hospitalizations.2 In the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program itself, 
the ACOs most likely to achieve 
shared savings were those with 
the highest proportion of dually 
enrolled or disabled people,3 but 
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a recent study showed that reduc-
tions in hospitalizations accrued 
roughly evenly in high-risk and 
low-risk groups.4
Yet APMs have the potential to 
be harmful. Current risk-adjust-
ment methods are not sophisti-
cated enough to reliably distin-
guish poor-quality care from high 
medical and social risk. Risk-
adjustment models for readmis-
sion, for example, are notoriously 
poor, in part because they gener-
ally do not account for social fac-
tors, such as poverty, that are 
known to influence readmission. 
Cost measures have similar limi-
tations: research has shown that 
care for people dually enrolled in 
Medicare and Medicaid costs more 
than care for people who are not, 
even after coexisting conditions 
are accounted for, probably be-
cause of such factors as func-
tional status and social support 
that are not included in current 
risk-adjustment models.3 As a re-
sult, hospitals or clinics with a 
high proportion of poor patients 
may lose money under APMs 
through no fault of their own. 
Particularly in programs with a 
high level of downside financial 
risk, there is a powerful incentive 
for clinicians to avoid providing 
care for high-risk patients, which 
could have meaningful conse-
quences for access to care.
Indeed, a number of studies 
have demonstrated that value-
based payment programs dispro-
portionately penalize providers 
that serve poor people (see graph); 
such penalties could cause pro-
viders to avoid caring for these 
groups. As value-based payment 
and APMs begin to be used for 
physician reimbursement, these 
problems could be exacerbated, 
since there is greater economic 
segregation5 — and probably low-
er ability to bear risk — at the 
practice level than at the hospital 
or health system level.
APMs could also harm vulner-
able populations if cost targets 
provide incentives for providers 
to cut back too far on services. 
This effect was a concern under 
1990s capitation programs, which 
were seen as encouraging clini-
cians to withhold services from 
patients. Although the use of qual-
ity measures may protect against 
this reaction to some degree, such 
measures are neither comprehen-
sive nor specific enough to do so 
in all instances. For example, poor 
and minority patients are less 
likely than others to undergo 
percutaneous coronary interven-
tion after myocardial infarction5; 
if clinicians face the added pres-
sure of financial incentives to re-
duce spending, access could be 
reduced even further for these 
groups. Such harms are insidious 
and, without a prospective effort 
to monitor and track such conse-
quences, could easily be ignored.
I believe that APMs should re-
ward clinicians for improving the 
things they can improve, while 
not penalizing them or holding 
them accountable for the things 
they can’t. Policymakers who wish 
to accelerate the growth of APMs 
while avoiding unnecessary harm 
to vulnerable populations and the 
clinicians who care for them might 
consider crafting payment mod-
els that adhere to a few key prin-
ciples.
First, given the evidence that 
poverty and functional status, 
among other factors, strongly in-
fluence patient outcomes, APMs 
could include these factors in risk 
adjustment. Failing to account for 
them means underestimating the 
quality of care provided by clini-
cians serving high-risk popula-
tions and overestimating the qual-
ity provided by those serving 
low-risk populations; in many 
programs, the result is a transfer 
of money from clinicians caring 
for high-risk patients to ones 
caring for low-risk patients. Such 
redistribution is unfair to clini-
cians and patients and is not an 
appropriate path.
Second, in cases in which risk 
Effect of Value-Based Payment Programs on Providers That Serve the Poor.
For the three hospital programs, the Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) index, a measure of 
the proportion of care provided to low-income patients, was used to define the top quintile. For 
the Physician and End-Stage Renal Disease programs, the proportion of beneficiaries dually enrolled 
in Medicare and Medicaid was used to define the top quintile. Data are from U.S. Department of 
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adjustment is inadequate to per-
mit fair comparisons among pro-
viders, APMs could evaluate par-
ticipants on improvement rather 
than solely on achievement. If one 
physician practice serves an afflu-
ent, low-risk population and an-
other serves an impoverished, 
high-risk population, it may be 
infeasible to fairly compare the 
two groups’ admission rates for 
diabetes, given the limited infor-
mation available in administra-
tive claims data. Both practices, 
however, could be rewarded for 
improving, and be adequately re-
sourced and supported to do so. 
Such an approach could drive ad-
vances in quality without penal-
izing practices serving more com-
plex populations and could be 
implemented within rulemaking 
rather than requiring legislation 
in many current APMs.
Third, APMs could reward 
quality improvements proportion-
ally rather than taking an all-or-
nothing approach. Currently, a 
primary care doctor who helps 
a patient with uncomplicated 
hypertension to reduce her sys-
tolic blood pressure from 145 to 
140 mm Hg would achieve the 
quality metric of “blood pres-
sure under con-
trol,” but a doctor 
who helps a patient 
with chronic kid-
ney disease and diabetes reduce 
his blood pressure from 190 to 
145 mm Hg — an accomplish-
ment with much more profound 
clinical consequences — would 
receive no credit. Under a propor-
tional-improvement–based meth-
od, clinicians would have incen-
tives to focus on patients whose 
conditions had the most room 
for improvement. Such a system 
would require a more sophisti-
cated approach to quality mea-
surement, but as we increasingly 
attend to population health and 
capture more data electronically, 
it is an essential and increasingly 
feasible proposition.
Fourth, if we truly want APMs 
to drive a focus on the most vul-
nerable among us, we should ex-
plicitly design them to do so. We 
could link payment to measures 
that examine access to care among 
dually enrolled beneficiaries, or 
outcomes specifically among high-
risk populations, or reductions in 
disparities. Doing so would har-
ness financial incentives to drive 
improvement in the populations 
that need it most.
The further we move toward 
APMs with financial incentives 
that encourage providers to inno-
vate, address social needs affect-
ing health, and fundamentally 
change the way we provide care, 
the better things will be for our 
most vulnerable patients. While 
some organizations may be driven 
by a moral imperative to address 
social determinants of health, fi-
nancial incentives could persuade 
organizations that might not 
otherwise do so to focus on their 
neediest clients. However, if we 
introduce such incentives without 
close attention to how APMs af-
fect providers who serve vulnera-
ble populations, we risk causing 
more harm than good. As APMs 
proliferate, we will have to con-
sider these issues critically and 
track programs’ effects closely.
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Targeted Supplemental Data Collection — Addressing  
the Quality-Measurement Conundrum
Michael E. Chernew, Ph.D., and Mary Beth Landrum, Ph.D. 
The quality-measurement enter-prise in the U.S. health care 
industry faces a conundrum. 
Should we collect data on hun-
dreds of measures like those in 
Medicare’s merit-based incentive 
payment system (MIPS) and con-
tinue to expand the measure set 
by vetting ever more measures, 
or should we scale back to a core 
set of measures as exemplified 
by the Meaningful Measures ini-
tiative recently launched by the 
Centers for Medicare and Medic-
aid Services (CMS)? An expanded 
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